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Abstract 
The use of market mechanisms has been progressively introduced as an alternative solution to public 
service delivery since the 1980s. This work addresses an uncommon public service function – civil law 
notaries – and seeks to analyse the factors that led to the formation of diverse market structures as a result 
of the choice of the privatization path over civil service status by public notaries. The Portuguese 
government allowed public notaries the choice to go private and regulated a numerus clausus of notaries 
by district. After the reform was completed, a diversity of market structures prevails throughout the 278 
notarial districts. Our key hypothesis is that markets with multiple agents formed in jurisdictions having a 
larger and more profitable number of notary and legal acts that provided financial survival and profit. In 
contrast, monopolies formed as a result of a perceived absence of market opportunities and demand. 
During the period 2010-2011 we collected data from official statistics of the notary system supplemented 
by data on the economic and demographic features of each jurisdiction. Multinomial logistic regression is 
used to test the key hypothesis regarding market arrangements in the 278 notarial districts of Continental 
Portugal. 
Points for practitioners 
The trend in the deregulation of the notary profession is likely to continue to sweep European Union 
countries. Lessons can be drawn from the Portuguese experience, where the change from civil service 
status is not yet mandatory for all notaries, but financial constraints and fiscal pressures indicate 
privatization as the inevitable path.  
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2‘Stop a moment, brother! Perhaps we are incurring guilt needlessly. Perhaps she is 
really no witch!’ said the notary. ‘If the person sitting in there declares herself ready 
to make the sign of the cross, then she is not a child of the devil.’ 
The proposal was accepted. 
May Night, or The Drowned Maiden by Nikolai Gogol 

Background   
The use of market mechanisms has been progressively introduced as an alternative solution to 
public service delivery since the New Public Management reforms of the 1980s. The expectation was that 
competitive bidding and trading could maximize consumer choice in the market as well as lower costs of 
service provision. Over the years, the literature has explored privatization decisions in several service 
areas, including solid waste, health care and fire protection, among many others. Our work addresses an 
uncommon public service function – civil law notaries – and seeks to analyse the factors that led to the 
formation of diverse market structures as a result of the choice of the privatization path over civil service 
status by public notaries. 
The privatization of notaries in 2004 by the centre-right government led by Prime-Minister Durão 
Barroso was the most important attempt to deregulate the heavily regulated notary profession. This 
reform allowed all notaries working for the State and operating under civil service laws to become liberal 
professionals. In this case, privatization meant the transfer of ownership and employment status from the 
state to private hands, also often described as denationalization or ‘destatization’ (Savas, 2000). The 
voluntary nature of the reform coupled with the option given to all notaries choosing the privatization 
route to return to civil service status after a trial period of five years classifies this movement as an almost 
risk-free venture.  
Reverse privatization has been a topic of research in the privatization literature for some time, 
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However, prior research is centred on the dynamic decisions of contracting out and contracting back in 
undertaken by public officials and not much is said in terms of reversing property, something akin to 
‘voluntary nationalization’. In addition, voluntary privatization is also a rare event that requires further 
investigation. If combined, these features render the Portuguese reform of the notary system a completely 
original approach to privatization. The unpredictable consequences of this reform call for empirical 
research that can shed some light on its motivations and current status, in order to enrich the literature on 
the topic of privatization.   
Despite its unique nature and relevance for competition policy in the legal professions within the 
European Union, the notary reform and its impacts on notary markets and profession were never assessed. 
This work aims to fill this important lacuna by investigating the consequences of the reform. Research 
tackles two distinct, albeit related questions. First, what are the causes of the diversification of market 
structures generated by the privatization reform of the Portuguese notary system? Second, what are the 
prospects of this diversification for the clients of notary services? Taking into account the regulatory 
constraints still in place, we suggest additional policy initiatives to improve market competition and 
consumer choices.  
The first section provides a brief explanation of the civil law notary profession, namely its legal 
status, types of services rendered and the differences between civil law notaries and their common law 
counterparts. Next, we discuss market failures frequently associated with the notary profession and their 
implications for market regulation, efficiency and quality. The third section presents the arguments of 
Public Choice scholars suggesting that the current regulation of notary markets generates government 
failures and requires significant deregulation efforts. The fourth section describes the Portuguese 
privatization reform of civil law notaries, highlighting the unique characteristics of the deregulation 
movement as well as the mixed signals given by Portuguese governments involved in the process since 
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and this is followed by a discussion of the implications of the reform for market competition, consumer 
choice and service quality. We conclude with a set of policy recommendations and directions for future 
research. 
Civil law notaries: Definition and concepts  
Civil law or Latin notaries are appointed by the state and vested as public officials having the 
power to authenticate legal documents and transactions between private parties. In most countries where 
civil law notaries exist, the public nature of the function is reconciled with the framework of a liberal 
profession contributing to the double status of the notary profession. The ambiguity of this status is 
expressed by the fact that very often notaries possess a functional and territorial monopoly of some 
services and, at the same time, compete as private entrepreneurs in a market for other services (Suleiman, 
1987).  
Professionals hold undergraduate degrees in law and are required to take specialized graduate 
training in order to qualify for membership in the professional body, in the Portuguese case the Ordem 
dos Notários. Notary services include attesting the signature and execution of documents, estate and 
testamentary proceedings, residential and commercial conveyance and registration, business transactions, 
marital agreements, divorces, contract drafting and powers of attorney. In contrast with civil law notaries, 
their common law counterparts have less formal training, are not licensed by the state and enjoy a much 
more limited set of powers.  
Civil law notaries impartially represent the transaction assuming responsibility for its contents, 
proving its authenticity and giving it probative value under civil law. The transaction is armour plated 
with legal certainty by the civil law notary’s findings, which ensures a presumption of validity that is 
nearly bullet proof against rebuttal by a contesting party. In order to fulfil this role of impartiality, civil 
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engrossment (escritura pública), which contains the original seal and signatures of the transaction. 
Certain acts that do not require public form such as powers of attorney, covenants and notary affidavits 
and attestations are exempt from this requirement. 
The importance of civil law notaries resides in their role of preventive legal security. Services 
provided by notaries help minimize transaction costs among contracting parties and generate cost savings 
for third parties not involved in the transaction but potentially affected by it. Notary documents reduce the 
costs of litigation because they have probative value that constitutes an extrajudicial form of proof. Due to 
their public nature, notary archives also provide information to the State on illegal activities such as 
money laundering at virtually no cost. In sum, the notary system and organisation is based on the 
willingness of society to facilitate business transactions, thus reducing the costs incurred by the State in 
creating a system of preventive legal certainty (Collantes, 2005). 
Historically, the civil law notary profession has been highly regulated by statute. The argument in 
favour of regulation is based on the assumption of welfare economics that, in the absence of government 
intervention, the market would fail to provide the appropriate amount of preventive legal security 
associated with notary services (Collantes, 2005; Van den Bergh and Montangie, 2006). More recently, 
however, the tendency has been towards a significant deregulation of the notary profession. This 
deregulation movement was largely set off by the European Commission (European Commission, 2005; 
Paterson et al., 2003) and the OECD (2007), but the theoretical arguments favouring deregulation and 
privatization are derived from the economics of public choice (Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971; see also 
Mueller, 2003). The following sections presents a summary of these conflicting views and the influence
of these works on the notary profession and market.       
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 Notary services are frequently described as credence goods or post-experience goods because 
quality is difficult to assess both before and after purchase (Weimer and Vining, 2005). Market regulation 
is defended on the basis of securing the cost savings obtained from preventive legal security offered by 
the notary system, while simultaneously avoiding information asymmetries between notaries and clients 
and between the clients themselves. In other words, government regulation is frequently supported as a 
means to correct market failures, restore competition and generate efficient outcomes. 
Market entry regulation and exclusive rights 
The regulation of entry in notary markets is usually defended on the basis of maintenance of high 
quality standards and in the interest of consumers’ rights. Transactions of post-experience goods involve 
uncertainty about service quality and significant information asymmetries between buyer and seller. As a 
result, quality after purchase is accepted based on faith (Darby and Karni, 1973). Notary services have 
few tangible qualities that can be evaluated ex-ante by the buyer. Commercial quality expressed by the 
comfort of the waiting room, the sympathy of the staff, or the quality of the coffee being served can be 
easily assessed, but they are not part of the core services provided by notaries. In contrast, experience 
qualities such as impartiality, integrity and the quality of legal counselling can only be judged after 
service consumption. The effects associated with post-experience goods are difficult to assess because 
they tend to be extremely delayed in time (Nelson, 1970; OCDE, 2007; Vining and Weimer, 1988; 
Weimer and Vining, 2005). 
Repeated plays can increase certainty because experience provides useful information to more 
accurately judge service quality. Large clients are better able to take advantage of frequent transactions to 
ascertain the quality of services rendered by notaries. In contrast, small consumers seldom require the 
services of notaries, which puts them in a weak position in a deregulated market (Collantes, 2005; Van 
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These arguments suggest that a university degree in Law, notarial internships, professional exams 
and licensing and mandatory enrolment in a professional association are ways to minimize information 
asymmetry between notaries and their clients. On one hand, because notaries act as gatekeepers of 
legality in private transactions, they reduce transaction costs among parties, generate benefits for third 
parties and contribute to an ex-ante enforcement of the law. On the other hand, standardization also 
produces judicial positive externalities, since public authentication and legality checks ensure evidentiary 
value that contributes to a reduction of litigiousness and the minimization of ex-post transaction costs 
(Arruñada, 1996; Van den Bergh and Montangie, 2006). 
   
Market conduct regulation 
Public goods are characterized by joint consumption and impossibility of exclusion. Joint 
consumption means that rivalry is absent at the time of fruition; in other words, the fact that one person 
benefits from purchasing one service does not preclude other individuals from reaping (external) benefits 
from the same service. A good or service characterized by the impossibility of exclusion means that 
individuals obtain benefits from the good or service being provided irrespective of their individual 
contributions to its production. 
Notary services display both public good features. Joint consumption occurs because preventive 
legal security benefits not only those directly engaged in the transaction but also society in general. The 
impossibility of exclusion is translated by the fact that all members of society benefit from the preventive 
legal security associated with notary services, even though only a few individuals actually buy these 
services. However, if left to its own devices, the notary market will undersupply legal certainty. Even 
though notaries may act impartially before the parties involved in a business transaction, they will have 
no incentives to defend third party interests. Government intervention imposing limitations on market 
8conduct – price regulation, interdiction of publicity and restrictions on organisational structure – is 
expected to create incentives that enhance service quality and bring the amount of legal certainty to 
optimal levels (OCDE, 2007; Van den Bergh and Montangie, 2006). Even though this logic is normally 
counterintuitive in economic terms, the protection of notaries from competition is intended to prevent 
them from ‘cutting corners’ to maximize profits. In other words, the expectation is that restrictions in 
market conduct helps to secure a sizable income that minimizes incentives to defect from their obligations 
to clients in terms of impartiality, integrity and quality of legal counselling. Given the service features 
involved in notary activities, this benign view of regulation deserves at least the benefit of the doubt. 
Government failure and the deregulation of notary markets
Regulatory intervention in notary markets is currently under attack, both due to economic 
globalization supporting the free circulation of legal professionals and as a result of liberalization 
initiatives promoted by the World Bank and the European Commission (Patterson et al., 2003; Shaw, 
2007a; World Bank, 2005). The central argument driving this reform movement is that many regulatory 
restrictions are likely disproportionate and out-of-date, leading to higher prices, low incentives to 
innovation and significant welfare losses for consumers of notary services (Arruñada, 2006; 2007; 
Noailly and Nahuis, 2010; OECD, 2007). Rather than promoting the public interest, regulation of notary 
markets is believed to embody the preferences and interests of this legal profession (Arruñada, 1992, 
2006; Suleiman, 1987).  
Market entry deregulation 
 Despite the benefits associated with professional standards identified in the previous section, 
certain entry regulations can be unduly restrictive of competition, resulting in welfare losses to consumers 
of notary services and younger professionals. An excessive barrier to market access arises when notaries 
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regulation or by lobbying governments. Weimer and Vining (2005: 182-183) correctly point out that 
‘high entry standards deny consumers the opportunity to choose low quality, but low price, services; and 
when professional interests control the licensing standards, the standards may be set unduly high to 
restrict entry so as to drive up the incomes of the existing practitioners.’ The existence of a numerus 
clausus (a geographical cap or restriction) and/or notary office licensing (a bureaucratic form of control) 
constitute other examples of disproportionate regulation of entry that limits competition and produces 
inefficient outcomes in the notary market.  
The rationale for deregulation is that it is possible to reduce barriers to entry without 
compromising the overall quality standards (Arruñada, 1992). Lower requirements allow well-established 
professionals to still charge high prices for high quality services, while simultaneously accepting young 
and inexperienced professionals to charge lower fees to expand their client base. Consumer choice and 
access to notary services by low-income clients would increase as a result of market entry deregulation.  
Market conduct deregulation 
The argument in favour of government regulation of market conduct has caused more harm than 
good, promoting inefficiency and undermining incentives to innovation (Arruñada, 1996, 2006). Price 
fixing, advertising prohibitions and restrictions in business structure and organisation are some of the 
instruments employed by governments to ‘protect the public interest’. Instead, these regulations have 
produced one of the closest and most symbiotic relationships between the State and private interests 
(Suleiman, 1987). This proximity also explains the difficulty in reforming notary institutions and the 
notary profession across many countries in Western Europe. 
Given the privileged status of notaries in many countries in Continental Europe, fixed pricing is 
usually employed to prevent notaries from charging rent-maximizing prices to their clients (Weimer and 
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Vining, 2005). Price regulation, however, is frequently associated with regulatory capture, whereby 
members of a well-organized profession lobby government officials for protective legislation (Peltzman, 
1976; Stigler, 1971). The use of price ceilings coupled with monopoly status generates x-inefficiency, 
because notaries do not feel competitive pressures to improve technical efficiency that could lead to price 
reductions and service quality improvement (Leibenstein, 1966; Weimer and Vining, 2005). 
Most notary acts are post-experience goods that involve significant information asymmetries 
between buyers and sellers. Advertising can be useful when notaries are interested in developing a good 
reputation, because consumers are better able to make informed decisions regarding prices, legal quality 
and commercial quality. Unfortunately, restrictions on advertising are also rather common in legal 
professions to the detriment of market efficiency. 
Finally, notary offices are not free to organize their activities as they see fit. Territorial dispersion 
of service delivery is usually interdicted, so that notaries are not allowed to open a branch at another 
location, even if this is a potentially profitable endeavour. This limitation compromises efficiency because 
notaries are unable to take advantage of geographic dispersion, more specialized structures or 
collaborative associations with other legal professions. The restriction imposed upon business structure 
and organisation remains in most countries in continental Europe, although France is a well-known 
example of early deregulation (since 1990) by allowing the formation of mono-professional and pluri-
professional partnerships alongside with individual notaries (Shaw, 2007b). 
Government regulation of notary market conduct has provided no incentives to innovation. 
Notaries protected by statute are not subject to the kind of competitive pressures that generate 
advancements in the profession. In fact, studies have shown that in countries where notaries are subject to 
competition from lawyers, such as Austria, quality, technological innovation and social relevance tend to 
increase substantially (Shaw, 2007b). 
A review of public choice theory suggests that the regulation of notary services is plagued by 
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many of the same problems facing the presence of government in other activities, including productive 
inefficiency, rent-seeking activities and an endemic absence of innovation (Dunleavy, 1991; Mueller, 
2003; Osborne and Gabler, 1992). Even though these arguments have become the dominant view among 
international organisations and have been the leading factors driving notary reform, it should be stressed 
that the regulation of notary services and the market structure associated with it do provide certain 
technological advantages. The mix of public and private functions secures economies of scope, whereas 
the combination of a centralized definition of quality standards with the geographical dispersion of direct 
providers brings about economies of scale (Arruñada, 1996). Furthermore, the minimization of 
transaction costs associated with notary services reduces information asymmetries and generates legal and 
judicial positive externalities.  
The conflicting arguments between the market failure and government failure frameworks have 
led to the recommendation of a comprehensive policy analysis of regulation in order to justify the need 
and extent of government regulation of private choices in general and legal professions in particular 
(Arruñada, 1996; Van den Bergh and Montangie, 2006). In spite of this recognition, the reform of notary 
systems across Europe has progressed towards increased deregulation and liberalization. In Portugal, as 
we shall see in the next section, the reform followed a similar trend. 
  
The Portuguese notary system: Privatization, regulation and (no) choice  
Contrary to most countries in continental Europe, notaries in Portugal were public officials subject 
to civil service laws and not liberal professionals. This rather unique status can be traced back to feudal 
relationships and is ‘based on the assumption that what needs to be protected by statutory measures are 
not the rights of the individuals but the rights of the state’ (Shaw, 2007b: 167). This civil service status 
characterized notaries during the dictatorship of António Oliveira Salazar (1926-1974) and remained 
largely unchanged until 2004. 
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In France, the notaires developed a strategic approach aimed to promote internal reforms, to study 
the implications of the liberal agenda of the European Commission, and to exchange experiences with 
other civil law notaries in Europe (Shaw, 2006). In England and Wales, the profession has gone through a 
significant modernisation impetus, particularly in terms of upgraded training, professionalization, and 
market liberalisation, aiming to achieve mutual recognition of notarial qualifications in Europe (Shaw, 
2000). But nowhere else has the notary profession undergone a more market-oriented reform as in 
Holland (Nahuis and Noailly, 2005; Noailly and Nahuis, 2010). The Portuguese notary reform has 
accomplished less than the Dutch reform in terms of market liberalisation, but given its starting point it 
has produced significant changes in the status and practice of the notary profession. 
The reform of Portugal’s notary system can be traced back to 2001, when the Government of the 
Socialist Party led by António Guterres promoted a change in the prices of notary acts charged to service 
users to reflect actual service costs (Law-Decree nº 322-A/2001). Despite this initiative to introduce cost-
oriented fees, notary fees remained strictly regulated for each service and no price ranges were allowed. 
The double status typical of the notary profession – liberal professional with public functions – 
was only established by Law-Decree nº 26/2004. The reform focused on privatization and liberalization 
policy measures. Notaries were given the opportunity to privatize, which for all intents and purposes 
meant a change in property ownership of notary offices as well as notary databases concerning property 
conveyances, mortgages and inheritances, among other services. All notaries choosing the privatization 
path were allowed to keep their civil service status by means of an unpaid leave and could opt to reverse 
privatization after a five year trial period. In addition, private lawyers and solicitors were allowed to 
compete with notaries in certain notary acts, namely the purchase and sale of real estate property. 
Based on the classification by E.S. Savas (2000), this policy initiative can be described as a 
divestment, since it entails a positive act by government to transfer property ownership to a qualified 
group of professionals. However, given that the reform of the notary system in Portugal also resulted in 
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the reduction of the number of civil servants in this profession, it can also be classified as displacement 
(by withdrawal or deregulation), whereby government shrinks the size of its effort and allows the private 
sector to expand its role in this particular function (Hodge, 2000; Savas, 2000). 
By 2005, an OECD report on competition policy developments in Portugal described the 
regulation of the Notaries’ profession as ‘disproportionate, unjustified and unnecessary to protect and 
pursue public interest’ and recommended significant changes, particularly in terms of ‘barriers to entry, 
price fixing, advertising prohibitions and business structure restrictions.’ (OECD, 2005: 12). Up to this 
point, the status of the notary profession in Portugal resembled that of French notaires: “nationality 
requirement, numerus clausus, fixed fees, ban on advertising, and limitations on permissible 
organisational structures.” (Shaw, 2006: 266). However, unlike France, the Portuguese notaries were not 
sufficiently close to the Ministry of Justice to lock-in many of their exclusive rights, particularly those 
related with property conveyance, firm establishment, and commercial business transactions.   
Elected in 2005, the centre-left government led by Prime Minister José Sócrates sponsored a 
counter-reform harshly criticized by members of the notary profession that has undermined the coherence 
of the initial reform. Since that time, the Ministry of Justice has been committed to several initiatives 
designed to undercut bureaucracy by reducing the number of steps required in the creation, management 
and closure of businesses (OECD, 2009). These initiatives began in 2006 and include fast-track home 
buying, one-stop firm creation and online trademark registration, among others. Many of these actions no 
longer require the intervention of notaries to be valid as in the case of the creation of associations and 
foundations, the approval of statutes or statutory changes and the transfers and leases of commercial and 
industrial establishments (Autoridade da Concorrência, 2007b). Others still require notary intervention, 
but administrative simplification was accompanied by a reorganisation of the mission statement of 
existing public offices to provide these streamlined services in direct competition with notaries.  
In October 2010, Alex Himmel, the Chairman of the Order of Notaries in Portugal accused the 
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Portuguese Government of attempting to destroy the notary profession by promoting unlawful 
competition by the State. In complementary services to notary acts where State agencies have monopoly 
power, prices were substantially increased, whereas those where State agencies compete with private 
notaries were priced below cost, a form of State-sponsored dumping. As a result, notaries are now 
competing with single-purpose public agencies as well as private lawyers in delivering specialized 
services, lending credence to the accusation of the Chairman of the Order of Notaries that government is 
engaged in unlawful competition with the profession.
Entry requirements and exclusive rights 
The access to the notary profession requires a MA degree in law (usually a four-year BA plus one 
year Master’s degree). Additional training is provided by the professional body – the Ordem dos Notários
– responsible for self-regulation in terms of on-going training programs for their members.  
Continental Portugal is divided in 278 notarial districts. A numerus clausus is established for each 
district according to demographic and economic criteria. A territorially-based occupational license is 
required for the operation of a notary office and awarded competitively by the Ministry of Justice (OECD, 
2007). The territorial limitation of competency combined with the prohibition of notary extensions and 
collaboration among notaries is thought to hinder access to notary services, especially in remote areas 
where user choice is limited, resulting in underserved populations (Autoridade da Concorrência, 2007b). 
 Portuguese notaries have exclusive rights to elaborate public deeds and wills, but Government 
measures of administrative simplification have relaxed the requirements of public deeds in the fields of 
commercial law, property law and family law (OCDE, 2007). Private lawyers are allowed to compete 
with notaries in certain notary acts (property conveyances, for example). The Portuguese Competition 
Authority issued a recommendation to the Government supporting the elimination of the numerus 
clausus, the removal of licensing for notary offices and the end of territorial competency, but no action on 
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these matters was undertaken at this time (Autoridade da Concorrência, 2007b).  
Market conduct: Fees, advertising, partnerships and business structure 
During the first stage of liberalization, fees for notary services remained largely regulated by 
statute. Regulation defined either the exact amount to be charged for each act or proportional fees 
depending on the value of notary acts (Portaria nº 385/2004, April 16). After July, 2008, fees were 
liberalized for all notary acts for which competition from other professionals, public and private, is 
available in the market. This includes property conveyances, firm creation, attestations of signatures, 
certification of translations, among many others. Price ceilings remain for acts involving exclusive rights 
(Portaria nº 574/2008, July 4), although the Portuguese Competition Authority recommends these should 
reflect service costs (Autoridade da Concorrência, 2007a).  
Advertising is strictly forbidden for all notary activities, including publicity regarding charged fees 
and service quality; the only information that notaries can publicize concerns operation hours, location 
and academic training. The professional organisation (Ordem dos Notários) is responsible for the 
enforcement of advertising regulations, even though disciplinary action in general is shared with the 
Ministry of Justice due to the aforementioned double status of civil law notaries.  
Notaries are also severely restricted in terms of their business structure and organisation. The 
creation of affiliated societies, branches, agencies or other forms of territorial expansion is forbidden 
along with the interdiction of incorporation or collaboration with other notaries to take advantage of 
economies of scale and specialization. This prevents the adoption of more cost-efficient organisational 
forms and constitutes a formal limitation of market competition (Autoridade da Concorrência, 2007b). 
Multidisciplinary association with other elements of the legal professions such as lawyers and solicitors is 
also prohibited in order to preserve notary impartiality and independence.   
Finally, one of the most unusual features of the Portuguese notary system is perhaps the presence 
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of a compensation fund guaranteeing a minimum income for notaries. In remote and less populated areas 
where notary activities may be insufficient to generate enough income to balance costs, notaries have 
access to a compensation subsidy established by statute and managed by the Ordem dos Notários 
(Preâmbulo do Decreto-Lei nº 26/2004). The compensation fund was created to level off notary incomes 
that resulted from liberalization/privatization, but came under heavy criticism by the Portuguese 
Competition Authority. The fund has been described as a disincentive to innovation and investment, 
capable of undermining the positive effects of deregulation upon market competition (Autoridade da 
Concorrência, 2007b). Informal discussions with private notaries suggest that the compensation fund has 
never worked properly, since higher income notaries have resisted to contribute to the fund.  
The privatization decision: ‘Should I stay or should I go?’      
The uniqueness of the privatization reform in Portugal lies in its voluntary nature. All notaries 
were public officials at the time of reform in 2004. The statute provided them the option to become 
private while maintaining their civil service status, by taking advantage of a five year unpaid leave. At the 
end of this five year period, notaries were allowed to reacquire their public employee status if they wish, 
thus rendering this ‘lukewarm’ reform an almost risk free endeavour for all notaries.  
The privatization reform produced a significant diversity of market structures across the 278 
notarial districts in continental Portugal. This variety can be attributed to individual decisions by notaries 
to either maintain civil service status or opt for the privatization of their services. What are the causes of 
this diversification of market structures? Given the outcomes of the reform, what are the prospects for the 
clients of notary services? 
The current trend of deregulation of notary markets is largely the product of the widespread 
perception among international organisations (e.g. OECD, World Bank and the European Commission) 
that significant efficiency gains can be obtained from the deregulation of notary markets. Moreover, the 
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large number of notaries present in the market (plus younger professionals wishing to enter) indicates that 
consumer welfare gains are likely to offset firm losses resulting from deregulation (Weimer and Vining, 
2005). However, since notary services entail positive externalities and display public goods features, 
some government regulation is still needed and should be designed to protect against these market 
failures, while simultaneously avoiding unduly intrusion in the market. These countervailing pressures 
have resulted in diverse market structures depending upon the conditions present in each notary district. 
If the assumptions regarding deregulation and market competition are correct, market 
diversification should be largely related with the size of the market for notary services (Noailly and 
Nahuis, 2010). Notarial districts with more population represent an opportunity for profit and, as a result, 
are expected to have more private notaries.  
The choice of privatization is also likely driven by specific opportunities provided by the demand 
of notary acts. The number of private notaries should be positively associated with new housing 
construction, elderly population and marriage certificates, which are linked with an increased number of 
property transactions, wills and testaments and marriage contracts, respectively.  
Besides new housing, the average property value can also be regarded as a demand factor (Noailly 
and Nahuis, 2010). Higher property values can be positively associated with privatization because they 
represent potentially higher revenues to be captured from deeds and conveyances. We also expect to find 
more private notaries in districts characterized by higher income per capita and population growth. These 
hypotheses regarding the diversification of markets for civil law notaries assume that these are 
economically rational agents responding to incentives for liberalization created by the notary reform.     
Data and methods 
 This research addresses two related questions. First, what are the causes of market structure 
variation generated by the reform of the Portuguese notary system? Second, what are the prospects for 
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consumers resulting from this reform? In order to answer these questions, we analyse data from notary 
markets describing market structures before and after the reform and attempt to identify the causes for the 
increasing diversity of structures in the aftermath of the reform. 
The dependent variable is the characterization of the market structure in each notarial district. It 
is coded as follows: private monopoly (coded 1), duopoly (coded 2), market with three or more private 
agents (coded 3) and market with three or more public and private agents (coded 4). The omitted category 
is public monopoly as this was the market’s default prior to notary reform. The 278 notarial districts in 
2011 are classified as follows: 87 public monopolies (31.29 percent), 110 private monopolies (39.57 
percent), 46 duopolies (16.55 percent), 18 markets with three or more private agents only (6.47 percent) 
and 17 markets with three or more public and private agents (6.12 percent). The dependent variable is 
measured in 2011, to reflect the most recent decision faced by all notaries to become private, stay private, 
reverse to public or stay public.   
Multinomial logistic regression is appropriate when the categories of the dependent variable are 
discrete, nominal or unordered (Long, 1997). The model assumes a reference category and provides the 
odds, in probabilistic terms, of the other categories (Borooah, 2002). Maximum likelihood is employed 
for estimating regression coefficients because the errors do not follow a normal distribution and do not 
have constant variance. Robust standard errors are calculated with the Huber/White/Sandwich (HWS) 
variance estimator.  
The econometric analysis includes a series of independent variables that capture market size and 
potential demand for specific notary services. The size of the market is gauged by the notarial district 
population and by the number of notary acts performed in the previous year. Both variables appear in 
natural log form. The demand for conveyances (property transactions) is measured by the number of new 
housing construction (natural log) and by the average property value measured as the ratio between the 
total value of real estate transactions divided by 100,000 and the total number of transactions. The 
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potential demand for wills and testaments is measured by the proportion of citizens aged 65 and older. 
The number of marriages per 1000 inhabitants is the proxy for marriage contracts signed by the parties 
and attested by notaries. Population growth is the variation in notarial district population between the 
years of 2001 and 2010. The effects of the coefficients for all variables of interest are expected to be 
positively associated with alternative market structures to public monopolies. Following Noailly and 
Nahuis (2010), income per capita (natural log) and youth population (0-14) are included as control 
variables.  
Data for this project were assembled from official sources made available from the Ministry of 
Justice and the professional association of public notaries. Data on population structure and evolution, 
income per capita, the number of new housing construction and the average property value per notarial 
district is available from the National Bureau of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatística). Data 
concerning market structures were gathered from the Public Institute of Notaries (Instituto de Registos e 
Notariados) and the professional association of notaries (Ordem dos Notários). Data on notary acts was 
collected from the Directorate General for Justice Policy (Direcção-Geral da Política para a Justiça). All 
variables are 2010, unless otherwise indicated. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for all variables 
included in the analysis. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
Empirical findings 
Table 2 presents data on the evolution of notary market structures for the 278 notarial districts in 
continental Portugal. Before privatization was allowed in 2004 there were only three possible market 
structures: Public monopolies comprised 87 percent of all notarial districts, with the remaining 
jurisdictions characterized either as public duopolies (7.5 percent) or by three or more public notaries (5.4 
percent). After privatization, a significant proportion of the 278 notarial districts are still characterized by 
a single notary office run by an official with civil service status. The year 2005 marks the first time 
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notaries were allowed to choose liberal professional status over civil service status, but 80 out of 278 
districts remained public monopolies (29 percent). The majority of market structures are now private 
monopolies (41.9 percent). Market structures with only private agents represent a small percentage of the 
total (8.8 percent). 
[Insert table 2 here] 
Table 2 also presents data regarding the second moment of decision. After the first five year 
period, notaries were again asked to choose between liberal professional (private) status and civil service 
status. Data concerning the 2011 decision indicates that changes were marginal, including a slight trend 
towards the reversion of privatization. Overall, notary markets are characterized by the pervasiveness of 
monopolist or quasi-monopolist structures, largely as a result of the numerus clausus. These findings 
allow us to question whether the expected effects of liberalisation have been captured by consumers or, 
conversely, whether liberalisation has resulted in limited competition and unwarranted market power by 
private notaries. 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
In order to supplement the analysis, figure 1 provides more detailed information regarding the 
transformation of market structures. Close inspection points to a limited conversion of public monopolies 
into multiple agent market structures. In fact, from the initial situation of 242 public monopolies in 
notarial districts only seven were converted into market structures with three or more agents (private or 
mixed). This further reinforces the idea that the privatization reform in Portugal had very limited effects 
in terms of promoting competition among notary offices.  
[Insert table 3 here] 
Table 3 displays multinomial logit model estimates for the formation of alternative market 
structures to a public monopoly for the provision of notary services. The findings concerning market size 
and demand for conveyance services are consistent with the general predictions of deregulation and 
market attractiveness. Market diversification is associated with increased population and number of 
21
notary acts as well as with higher average property values. Notary districts which combine these features 
are more likely to display private or mixed multiple agents. 
Districts characterized by higher housing prices attract more agents and, at least in theory, this 
favours the emergence of increased competition. Likewise, the data indicates that there are more agents in 
more populated areas and where the number of transactions or notary acts is higher. Without data on 
notary fees it is impossible to ascertain if prices decreased as a consequence of market diversification, but 
the analysis indicates that there is at least some potential for substantial gains in consumer welfare in 
urban areas as a result of notary reform.  
The only result inconsistent with this conclusion is the population growth variable, which 
displays negative and statistically significant coefficients for markets where three or more agents are in 
operation. In substantive terms, this means that jurisdictions experiencing significant population increases 
are not characterized by market diversity. In practice, these findings partly contradict the idea that 
emerging markets are better suited for expansion and choice by clients of notary services.  
Conclusions and policy implications 
The reform of the Portuguese notary system entails unique features that deserve careful analysis. 
This project attempts to answer two critical questions associated with the reform. First, we analysed the 
causes of the reform for the diversification of notary markets. Despite the incentives for the conversion of 
public notaries under civil service law into liberal professionals, many notarial districts remain either 
public monopolies or districts where at least a few notaries are public officials. Partly, this is due to 
voiced concerns about excessive competition between agents operating in each notary district that could 
significantly reduce notaries’ incomes. However, this unease was toned down by a series of regulations
such as the system of numerus clausus, the compensation fund and protective regulation concerning 
market entry and conduct that rendered the privatization decision a rather ‘risk-free’ alternative. This is 
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hardly surprising, since prior work on Portuguese privatization initiatives reports the systematic formation 
of monopolies in other sectors, such as public utilities, with the state unwilling or unable to counteract the 
weight of economic pressure groups (Rocha and Araújo, 2007). Given this setting, the only surprise is 
that so many notaries remain civil service employees, something that can only be explained by less 
tangible aspects, namely risk aversion and state dependence associated with the entrepreneurial culture in 
Portugal (Araújo, 2002).  
This study also aimed to understand the motives that drove the privatization decision. The 
analysis indicates that the conversion to liberal professional status occurred predominantly in more urban 
and populated areas, where the demand for notary services has been historically higher than the national 
average. As it happens in many other countries following the Latin notary tradition, the purchase and sale 
of property are one of the most relevant sources of income for notaries (Arruñada, 2007; Shaw, 2007a) 
and the privatization decision seems to result from the analysis of market opportunities in terms of the 
number of past transactions and the value of properties transacted.  
The results of the analysis underline one evident outcome of the privatization reform. The 
initiative did not go far enough in terms of deregulation and promotion of market competition. Although 
the argument often employed is the concern with possible market failures related with significant market 
deregulation, the fact is that this strategy worked primarily to alleviate the state from the significant 
budget pressures associated with public notaries’ sizable salaries. In contrast with this unstated budgetary 
goal, the concern with clients’ choices was suppressed along the way, so that only a few notarial districts 
present real alternatives for individuals demanding notary services. Hence, this privatization initiative in 
Portugal seems to confirm the historical tradition that government intervention in notary services exists to 
protect the rights of the state rather than to safeguard the rights of the individuals (Shaw, 2007b). 
Our analysis suggests several policy implications. First, further deregulation is needed if real 
choice is to be achieved by clients of notary services. The numerus clausus severely limits the formation 
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of competitive markets, even in urban areas where one would expect to see more private agents operating. 
Prior work has found slow entry in notary markets, even in The Netherlands, where the cap in notary 
districts has been lifted (Noailly and Nahuis, 2010). In Portugal, this problem is likely to be more serious, 
given not only the strict numerus clausus, but also the licensing requirements and the interdiction to 
collaborate among professionals.     
Second, the need for deregulation is particularly evident in the case of market conduct, namely in 
terms of ending the prohibition to advertise. Information provision is a crucial element in market 
competition. If notaries are not allowed to advertise their prices and quality levels, it becomes more 
difficult to promote wiser consumer choices. Even though clients are not prohibited from choosing notary 
services from notarial districts outside of their own, the fact remains that without quality and price 
comparisons, it is extremely challenging to make informed choices. 
The reform of the notary system in Portugal has reached a crossroads. The absence of a clear 
strategy resulting from different options taken by successive governments is compromising the initial 
reform efforts. Many former public notaries that initially opted for privatization already expressed their 
wish to return to civil service status, forcing the current government to extend the trial period for another 
three years in an attempt to salvage market competition. The notary reform has failed to treat deregulation 
and liberalization as a package, with adverse consequences for consumer choices and welfare. Further 
deregulation is necessary to attract notaries to liberal status, improve market competition and secure the 
expected gains from privatization. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Indicator Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent variables 
Market structures 
0 = Public monopoly; 
1 = Private monopoly; 
2 = Duopoly; 
3 = Three or more private agents; 
4 = Three or more mixed agents 
278 1.317 1.422 0 4 
Independent variables 
Population Natural log 278 9.818 1.113 7.421 13.081
Income Natural log 278 6.679 .161 6.368 7.419 
Youth   Population under 14 278 5496. 673 9330.909 224 81004 
Elderly 
population  
Proportion of population aged 65 
and older 
278 22.086 5.839 10.506 40.766 
Average property 
value 
Ratio between total value of 
transactions (divided by 100,000€) 
and the number of transactions 
278 1.156 .517 .421 4.266 
Notary acts  Natural log 278 8.25 1.222 5.642 12.816 
New housing 
construction  
Natural log 278 3.766 1.359 0 8.437 
Marriages Number per 1000 inhabitants 278 3.639 1.113 0 7.7 
Population growth Variation 2001-2010 278 -.781 10.284 -20.3 45.1 
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Table 2. Diversification of notary market structures (2004-2011) 
2004 
(initial status) 
2005 
(after 1st privatization 
decision) 
2011 
(after 2nd privatization 
decision) 
Obs. Percent Obs. Percent Obs. Percent 
Public monopoly 242 87.1 80 29.0 87 31.3 
Public duopoly 21 7.5 0 0 0 0 
Three or more 
public agents 
15 5.4 0 0 0 0 
Private monopoly   116 41.9 110 40.0 
Private duopoly   44 15.8 39 13.9 
Mixed duopoly   2 0.1 7 2.4 
Three of more 
private agents 
  24 8.8 18 6.4 
Three or more 
mixed agents 
  12 4.4 17 6.0 
Total 278 100 278 100 278 100 
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Table 3. Multinomial logistic regression analysis (dependent variable: Market structures) 
Private 
monopoly
Duopoly Three or more private 
agents 
Three or more public and 
private agents 
Independent 
variables 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Coefficient (RSE) Coefficient (RSE) 
Population 
   2.990**   
(1.483) 
3.803*   
(2.110) 
22.031***    
(4.642)   
19.161*** 
(4.624) 
Income 
.379 
   (2.433) 
.054  
 (6.640) 
2.827  
   (10.920) 
.749 
(10.255) 
Youth  population 
.000 
 (.000) 
-.002 
  (.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
Elderly population 
-.001* 
(.001) 
.001    
(.001) 
.000 
 (.001) 
.000 
(.001) 
Average property 
value 
-.016 
(.360) 
3.452*  
 (1.955) 
3.504*   
(2.081) 
4.112*    
(2.358) 
Notary acts 
      2.796***   
(.829) 
      7.608***  
(2.541) 
     20.421***   
(3.960) 
    25.301*** 
(4.509) 
New housing 
construction 
.230    
(.455) 
  1.779**  
(860) 
.566    
(1.827) 
1.860    
(2.171) 
Marriages 
.251  
  (.335) 
-.166    
(.705) 
-.871  
(.927) 
1.429    
(.954) 
Population growth 
.051 
          (.065) 
-.079 
(.093) 
   -.501*** 
(.172) 
-.376** 
(.186) 
Constant 
-49.869*** 
(15.085) 
-114.967** 
(51.239) 
-448.312*** 
(91.643) 
-460.504*** 
(98.087) 
Observations 
Wald chi2 
Prob>chi2 
Pseudo R2 
278 
559.64 
.0000 
.7314 
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; Two-tailed tests. Public monopoly is the base outcome. Robust standard errors (RSE) in parentheses.  
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Figure 1. Transformation of market structures in the Portuguese notary system (2004-2011)
PM: Public monopoly 
PD: Public duopoly 
3+PA: Three or more public agents 
Public 
monopoly  
Public 
duopoly  
Three or more 
public agents  
Public monopoly 
PM:85/PD:2 =87 
Private monopoly 
PM:110  
Private duopoly 
PM:36/PD:3 = 39 
Three or more mixed 
agents 
PM:1/PD:3/3+PA:13 = 17  
Mixed duopoly 
PM:5/PD:2 = 7 
Three or more private 
agents 
PM:5/PD:11/3+PA:2  = 18 
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